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Abstract
Land reform is concerned with intervention in the prevailing pattern of land ownership, control, and usage. In the case of land,
which is freely traded in the open market, the UK Treasury supports government intervention when some form of market failure has
been diagnosed, and if measures to correct for market failure can be shown to be cost-e!ective. Although market failure has been the
subject of intense research e!ort in the "eld of environmental and health economics, its potential role in land markets has not been
examined. With the prospect of new land reform legislation following closely on the creation of the Scottish Parliament, there is
therefore, a need to explore the economic case for intervention in the land market based on market failure. The conclusions, based on
the four case studies, are "rst that market failure is found to be present in the ownership and management of land, and second, that
much could be accomplished without the need for new legislation or signi"cant public "nancing. Although this paper has focused on
Scotland and the context for land reform demands di!ers throughout the world, one conclusion of global relevance is that market
failure, rather than the free-market per se is a more likely cause of social unrest over land. This can perhaps be best illustrated by local
land monopolies and the barriers that they can create for poorer members of society seeking access to the land resource. ( 2000
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Land reform is concerned with intervention in the
prevailing pattern of land ownership, control, and usage
(World Bank, 1975). In many countries the pressures for
land reform have arisen as a result of food scarcity and
rising population pressures; in others political ideology
or an historical sense of injustice have driven the land
reform process. For example, in Zimbabwe, an ambitious
land reform programme aims to redistribute arable areas
originally seized from native people by white settlers in
the last century, away from commercial farmers to poor
black farmers. In South America, native peoples are
"ghting to re-establish tribal rights over land expro-
priated by plantation owners and ranchers, and in East-
ern Europe the rapid adoption of a free-market policy
has led to the re-privatisation of state-owned land.
In Scotland, the origins of the land reform movement
are "rmly rooted in the 19th Century, when the same
concerns about social equity, poverty and colonialism,
which "nd resonance today in parts of post-colonial
Africa and South America, were very much in evidence.
The passing of the Crofters Act more than 100 years ago
by the British Parliament, which gave small tenant
farmers (crofters) greater security of tenure and control
over rent payments, is regarded as the &high-water mark'
of the land reform movement. In a British political con-
text, apart from a brief period following World War I,
when an e!ort was made to create new, small holdings
for returning veterans, land reform was not important,
and consequently did not attract much attention at Wes-
tminster. However, following the creation of the Scottish
Parliament in 1999, land reform has once again emerged
on to the political agenda, with new legislation to assist
community land purchase expected early in the Parlia-
ment's "rst-term (Scottish O$ce, 1999).
Although land reform is inextricably linked to issues of
rural development and employment, the economic case
for land reform has not been fully explored. In Scotland,
as in the rest of the UK, land is a freely traded commod-
ity and regardless of perceived historical injustices, the
rationale for government intervention in land is based on
neo-classical concepts of economic e$ciency and market
failure. Markets will only allocate resources e$ciently if
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1One could also argue that land reform provides the #edgling Scot-
tish Parliament the opportunity to demonstrate its powers on an issue
with broad popular support.
2 Jacobites were supporters of the exiled Catholic royal family.
Charles, the son of James VII of Scotland and II of England, led the
Jacobite army to defeat at Culloden Moor in 1745.
3Known as crofts.
4Resistance from the House of Lords and from Treasury representa-
tives in Scotland partly explains the failure of these policies (Leneman,
1989). However, it must also be recalled that with the creation of the
Forestry Commission in 1919, the government provided "nancially
pressed landowners with a less radical, and more lucrative, alternative
for their land.
a range of institutional arrangements prevail, such as
perfect information and the absence of externalities.
Where these arrangements are incomplete market failure
will occur.
Although market failure has been the subject of intense
research e!ort in the "eld of environmental and health
economics, its potential in#uence on land markets, and
the land reform debate has not been examined. The
purpose of this paper is "rst to demonstrate the presence
of market failure in land and second, to identify relevant
cost-e!ective strategies for government intervention.
Rather than attempt a general treatment of market fail-
ure in land, the paper concentrates on four case studies of
current importance in the land reform debate: red deer
management; community land purchase; forestry re-
planting; and the concentrated ownership pattern of
Highland estates.
Historical context
Although contemporary issues drive the current de-
bate, the prominence of land reform in Scottish political
life is perhaps best explained by the impact of the &High-
land Clearances' on the Scottish psyche.1 Following the
"nal defeat of the Jacobite cause in 1745 at Culloden,2
and the demise of the clan's military function, clan chief-
tains turned their attention to wealth creation by ad-
opting new land-based enterprises. The most profound
change on the local population was the introduction of
sheep at the expense of the traditional cattle-based sys-
tem.
Sheep ranching required the skills and labour of only
a few shepherds, hence thousands of people were evicted
from their traditional lands. Some emigrated to the &New
World', while others sought work in fast-growing indus-
trial towns and cities. A substantial number were also
settled in coastal areas, where each family was allocated
a small strip of land with access to the sea.3 However, the
amount of land allocated was rarely su$cient to support
a growing population, and families had to supplement
their income through employment in one of the land-
owners business ventures.
As the prosperity of sheep farming faded, the demand
for Highland land for sporting pursuits (hunting and
"shing), fuelled by the purchase of Balmoral by Queen
Victoria in the 1840s, grew among wealthy Victorians.
Land management concentrated almost exclusively on
the production of large numbers of game, especially
grouse and red deer, for a hunting season which rarely
lasted more than a few weeks. Although con#icts arose
between local farmers and sporting estates, large-scale
evictions were less frequent than had been the case with
sheep farming.
The juxtaposition of a hedonistic gentry, with a peas-
antry facing poverty and hardship, did however, create
economic, social and cultural tensions which led to the
development of a land reform movement. In Ireland,
which had experienced equally harsh social and eco-
nomic conditions, the Irish Land Act of 1881 was passed
which gave security of tenure to small farmers, and vir-
tually eradicated the old estate system (Hunter, 1976).
Enthusiasm for land reform spread to the Scottish High-
lands and in 1886 the Crofters Act was passed, which
gave crofters greater security of tenure and controls on
rent payments.
The passing of the Crofters Act in 1886, was the most
signi"cant achievement of the land reform movement.
During the period between 1911, when the Small Land-
holders Act (Scotland) was passed, and 1940, the govern-
ment attempted to provide opportunities for new small
holdings to be created from larger estates (Leneman,
1989). However, these opportunities were never fully ex-
ploited4 and, in contrast to Ireland, large estates still
dominate land ownership in Scotland. For example,
Wightman (1996) estimates that over 50% of the land
area is owned by fewer than 400 individuals or com-
panies.
Today the Highland economy is in transition. The
traditional land-based industries of agriculture and for-
estry are in decline, with new enterprises based on oil,
tourism and "sh farming taking over. However, the way
land is owned and managed is still considered to be an
important obstacle to sustainable rural development.
Leading advocates of land reform have highlighted nu-
merous aspects of the status quo which still require to be
addressed by legislation, including the prevailing feudal
system of tenure, restrictions on public access, and the
primacy of sporting interests over local economic devel-
opment.
Land reform and market failure
Although concerns about economic development fea-
ture highly in the arguments of both land reformers and
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5The Scottish Landowners Federation represent the owners of Scot-
land's largest estates and have been vociferous in their opposition to
many land reform measures.
Table 1
Institutional arrangements required for an e$cient allocation of re-
sources!
1 Markets exist for all goods and services
2 All markets are perfectly competitive
3 No externalities exist
4 There are no public goods
5 Property rights are fully assigned
6 All transactions have perfect information
7 All "rms are pro"t maximisers and all individuals
utility maximisers
8 Long run average costs are non-decreasing
9 Transaction costs are zero
10 All relevant functions satisfy convexity conditions
!Ref. Perman et al. (1996).
6Stalking refers to hunting red deer in Scottish mountians where the
openness of the terrain requires a stealthy approach to the deer.
landowners, each have taken a di!erent view of market
economics. Many leading land reformers would appear
to distrust the free-market system. One notable land
reformer argued strongly for land nationalisation, believ-
ing that the market in land had helped to create gross
inequalities in power and wealth (McEwen, 1981). By
contrast, the Scottish Landowners Federation5 would
appear to have complete faith in the market system, for
example by arguing that land reform is unnecessary be-
cause land is freely traded and hence the current distribu-
tion and the bene"cial rights to land must be e$cient.
However, neither analysis is entirely accurate. Current
inequalities in land ownership patterns are as much a leg-
acy of historical events and an archaic feudal property
rights system, than a consequence of market forces. Of
greater relevance to this paper, neither argument recog-
nises the possible role of market failure to land reform.
The e$cient allocation of resources in the economy
through the market mechanism requires that a range of
institutional arrangements prevail (Table 1). Few, if any,
markets meet all these requirements and when this oc-
curs &market failure' can arise. For example, markets
cannot control air or water pollution, because pollution
is a type of negative externality. A negative externality is
where some of the costs of production (poor air quality)
are borne by people other than the producer (e.g. local
people). Production of the good is ine$cient (over pro-
duced) because the polluters do not have to meet all the
costs of production.
Market failure is an important concept in neo-classical
economics as it provides an important rationale for gov-
ernment intervention in markets. For example, the UK
Treasury states that government intervention is justi"ed
where market failure is diagnosed, and the intervention
strategy is cost-e!ective in relation to the status-quo
(HM Treasury, 1997). Although market failure has been
the subject of intense research e!ort in the "elds of
environmental and health economics, its potential role in
the land reform debate has not been examined.
In this paper the role of market failure is examined for
four case studies: red deer and negative externalities;
public goods and community land purchase; the mono-
poly powers of large Highland sporting estates. A special
case of market failure, associated with government inter-
vention in forestry, perhaps more appropriately termed
&government failure' is also investigated. These case stud-
ies have been selected partly because of their relevance to
the current debate, but also because they demonstrate
a range of inadequacies in the institutional arrangements
governing land markets.
Case study A: red deer
The traditional objective of red deer (Cervus elaphus)
management in the Scottish Highlands is to maximise the
number of trophy stags available for stalking6. Trophy
stags are valued for their venison, but mainly for their
antlers, with income from shooting directly related to the
number and quantity of trophy stags shot annually.
Owners therefore seek to maximise the number of trophy
stags available for stalking by maintaining a high popu-
lation density of deer. This has been achieved through
a combination of underculling hinds, and by the provis-
ion of supplementary winter feeding. As a consequence,
the Scottish red deer population has increased from
150 000 in the early 1960s, to over 300 000 in the 1990s
(Youngson, 1995).
The ownership and management of large areas of the
Scottish Highlands for deer hunting has proved espe-
cially irksome to land reformers, who view the use of land
for hedonistic sporting purposes as a colonial inheritance
which prevents development of the land for agriculture,
forestry or tourism. While economists are not necessarily
concerned with the motives for owning land, the costs
which red deer impose on neighbouring land users, local
communities, and society represent a form of market
failure.
Although the right to hunt red deer on private land is
assigned to private landowners, the cost of red deer
damage are not necessarily incurred by the owners. In-
stead, deer damage a!ects other economic agents (both
producers and consumers) and is a classic example of
a negative externality. A negative externality occurs
when the production or consumption decisions of one
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Fig. 1. Optimal red deer population.
7For completeness, the social bene"ts of red deer are also included in
Fig. 1. These are unknown but are likely to be small in comparison to
the social costs, and relatively elastic with respect to deer numbers. For
example, the enjoyment some individual tourists may get from seeing
a herd of deer is unlikely to be heightened substantially as a result of
observing 100 or 200.
8Under the 1996 Deer Scotland Act, these powers were also extended
to the protection of the natural heritage, for example to conserve native
woodlands.
9The Deer Commission is the government agency responsible for
monitoring and controlling deer populations.
agent adversely a!ect others, and where no compensa-
tion is made. The external costs of red deer management
are many and varied, and include widespread damage to
agricultural crops, over-grazing of in-bye land and hill
pastures, damage to forestry crops through browsing and
bark stripping, the erection of exclusion fences to protect
woodlands, and over-grazing of areas which are impor-
tant for the natural heritage.
Where negative externalities are present, the economi-
cally optimal red deer population will diverge from the
market-determined population (Fig. 1). If only private
costs and bene"ts to the estate owner are considered, the
optimal red deer population will be relatively high (Q1),
re#ecting only the marginal private costs and bene"ts of
the landowner. If social costs, including negative ex-
ternalities, are considered then the socially optimal popu-
lation (QH) will be much lower7. Although no monetary
estimate of this damage has been made at a national
level, social costs are likely to run into millions, possibly
hundreds of millions of pounds annually. For example,
forest damage in Galloway, a region peripheral to the red
deer range in the Scottish Highlands, was estimated at C2
million per annum (Allison, 1990).
Coase (1960) showed how allocative e$ciency could be
achieved by internalising external costs through compen-
sation agreements, but this has not occurred in the case
of red deer because of high transaction costs. The only
alternative available to the State and neighbouring land
users is to exercise their right to shoot &rogue' animals
damaging commercial crops8. Although the State is em-
powered to recover the costs of culling operations from
owners, it has not done so. Hence, sporting estates have
historically had little incentive to control deer numbers,
as they do not bear all the costs of the expanding popula-
tion.
The current approach of the Deer Commission9 is to
rely on the voluntary principle, with landowners being
asked to undertake a culling programme agreed through
their local deer management group. Although over 50
such groups have been created covering the entire range
of red deer in Scotland, recent evidence suggests that this
voluntary approach has not been e!ective. For example
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Fig. 2. Optimality of a tradable deer cull quota system.
in 1995/96 the hind cull was 2000 animals less than the 27
000 needed to prevent the population from increasing
(Gordon}Du!}Pennington, 1997).
This situation has arisen primarily because the cost of
culling hinds on a number of estates, exceeds the revenue
obtained from venison sales. A more cost-e!ective ap-
proach would be to introduce a tradable enforcement
obligation on estate owners which would legally require
estates to meet a speci"c cull target. As in the case of
pollution permits, the ability to trade obligations would
ensure that culling was achieved at least cost to estate
owners and the national economy. The obligation would
ensure that the costs of culling were borne by sporting
estates, and not by other land uses or by the tax-payer
(e!ectively internalising the external costs of red deer
management for sport).
Fig. 2 illustrates how a tradable culling obligation
would be more cost-e!ective than a strict regulatory
approach. Estate A and B are neighbouring estates, but
for a variety of reasons face di!erent net revenue func-
tions for culling: Estate B is able to shoot up to 40 deer
pro"tably, while culling can only be done at a loss on
Estate A. If each estate is required to shoot 40 deer to
reduce the local deer population to a sustainable level,
both estates would bene"t if they trade quota up until the
point where the marginal net revenue from culling is the
same for both estates. In Fig. 2, this point occurs where
marginal net revenue is negative (C-10/deer), with a cull of
20 on Estate A, with Estate B ful"lling its quota of 40
deer, plus a further 20 deer on Estate A. As the marginal
net revenue function for B is negative, but higher than
that for A to the right of this point, Estate A would have
to o!er compensation with the quota obligation. If the
net revenue curves of both A and B were positive, trading
would still be more e$cient, although the culling obliga-
tion would have a positive value rather than a negative
one.
Permits could be made available for di!erent catego-
ries of animal (stag, hind, etc.), with the total number of
permits determined by the Deer Commission. Deer herds
roam over wide areas, hence it would be necessary to
establish cull targets for estates through Deer Manage-
ment Groups, with individual targets determined by land
area and deer density. The State would be empowered to
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10 Just what the cull should be is of course debatable. In an economic
sense, the optimal cull would be where the marginal social costs of red
deer equal the marginal social bene"ts. Currently the Deer Commission
is attempting to apply the scienti"c criteria of &carrying capacity' to
determine desired cull rates.
redistribute permit allocations (including stag permits),
away from those estates which consistently fail to ful"l
their full quota to other estates, hunting clubs, or to the
local community, with any associated costs being met by
the original estate. Overall the State's role would be
restricted to setting the annual cull obligation based on
scienti"c criteria10, and the administration of the permit
system for which a small charge could be levied per deer.
Permit systems typically exhibit dynamic e$ciency.
Hence, it is likely that the cost of culling would fall in the
long term, as estates became more cost-e$cient at cull-
ing, (for example, by selling hind stalking to a broader
client base than for trophy stags). However, it is likely
that land values will fall because most estates will either
have to incur higher culling costs than they do currently,
or be forced into broadening their client base to meet
their quota target. The latter option will reduce costs but
would undermine the price premium sporting estates
enjoy on the grounds of social exclusivity. (In the Scottish
Highlands, stalking is typically restricted to the owner,
his/her personal friends, and to wealthy clients who pay
in excess of C1000 for a trophy stag).
The introduction of obligatory quota system would,
therefore, have wider rami"cations for land reform and
the economic development of rural areas. For example,
lower land prices would generate more opportunities for
diversifying land ownership in Scotland through com-
munity land purchase. Investment in forestry and small-
holding would also be favoured by a fall in sporting
estate values.
There would also be other bene"ts to the local econ-
omy. Higher levels of culling and a broader client base
would also help create more jobs and economic activity
in rural areas due to increased expenditure on accommo-
dation, supplies and other services associated with hunt-
ing. Also, if opportunities to hunt became more widely
available due to the quota system, it can be envisaged
that poaching, and the problems poaching creates for
scienti"c management and animal welfare, would dimin-
ish.
Case study B: community land purchase
The relationship between rural communities and
owners of large estates has often been tense and acri-
monious. This can be attributed to the control which the
latter exercise over land-based development opportuni-
ties as the major landowner and feudal superior. Some
rural communities have responded to this impasse by
launching a public appeal to buy the local estate when it
has come on to the market. For example, the islanders of
Eigg (a Hebridean island o! the west coast of Scotland)
and the crofters of Assynt (in the north-west Highlands),
have both succeeded in purchasing their land after highly
successful public fund-raising campaigns.
Many people who donate to such land purchase ap-
peals do so, even though they will not directly bene"t. As
in the case of donations to environmental charities, altru-
istic concerns tend to stimulate giving. For example,
a study conducted during the Isle of Eigg appeal, found
that over 90% of people who donated funds to the appeal
were anxious to protect the culture and way of life of the
islanders, despite having never visited the island, nor
likely to do so (Macmillan et al., 1999).
However, public appeals do not produce an optimal
level of community ownership for two reasons. First,
public appeals for community land purchase are vulner-
able to free-riding behaviour. In other words, some indi-
viduals will not contribute to an appeal for funds even
when they have a positive willingness to pay because they
expect that others will contribute su$cient funds to pur-
chase the land. Second, charitable appeals face very high
transaction costs associated with information provision,
contractual details concerning ownership rights, and the
actual collection of donations. As most rural communi-
ties do not have the experience and fund-raising skills of
environmental charities, these transaction costs are likely
to be a major obstacle to concluding successful pur-
chases.
Recently the government has introduced or proposed
several innovations to assist community land purchase.
In 1997, it established the Community Land Unit within
Highlands and Islands Enterprise, to provide advice and
support. More recently, it has proposed new legislation
to give rural communities more time to bid for land when
it comes on the market, and a Scottish Land Fund,
"nanced with revenue from the National Lottery, as
a means to aid community &buy-outs' (Scottish O$ce,
1999).
Although the creation of a Land Fund will avoid the
drawbacks which private donations face in terms of free-
riding and high transaction costs, direct state interven-
tion in land purchase is likely to perform less well with
respect to targeting of "nancial assistance. Individual
donations are driven by personal preference which, in the
context of community land purchase, is likely to be
in#uenced by factors such as location, historical context,
and management objectives. By eschewing the market-
oriented approach of charitable giving in favour of
a Land Fund, there is a risk that the mechanism will
become heavily politicised and subject to sustained criti-
cism from various quarters (e.g. the Scottish Landowners
Federation, and presumably communities which do not
receive funding).
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Fig. 3. Economic internal rate of return (IRR) from replanting commercial forests in Scotland.
11 It can be expected that demand for this land would be fairly low if
WGS funds are withheld. As the rationale for grant support for private
planting is the provision of non-market bene"ts, there would be strong
argument against WGS funding for replanting uneconomic forests.
A more market-oriented solution would be the estab-
lishment of a charitable trust to organise and administer
land purchase appeals on behalf of rural communities.
Although it would have a distinctly di!erent remit (and
Board) from the National Trust for Scotland, a Com-
munity Land Trust could operate in a similarly successful
fashion, with land purchases determined by public dona-
tions, rather than government o$cials. Some public
funding of the Trust would be justi"ed on the grounds of
free-riding, but this should be directed towards reducing
administration and transaction costs rather than prefer-
entially subsidising the purchase of one or two selected
estates.
Case study C: forestry replanting
In the current land reform debate, it is often over-
looked that a government agency, the Forestry Commis-
sion (FC), is the single largest landowner in Scotland with
approximately 1.6 million acres of land (Wightman,
1996). Till the 1960s, the primary aims of the FC were to
establish a strategic reserve of timber in the case of war,
and to create employment in rural areas. More recently
forestry investment, including the replanting of harvested
stands, has been justi"ed on the grounds that woodlands
provide a range of non-market bene"ts such as recre-
ation, landscape enhancement, carbon storage and habi-
tat creation. In the private sector, planting subsidies,
administered through the Woodland Grant Scheme
(WGS), are provided to encourage the provision of these
non-market bene"ts. Although consistent with economic
theory in the sense that state "nance is being used to
increase the supply of woodland bene"ts which the mar-
ket would not otherwise provide, there is little evidence
that forestry investment decisions have been guided by
economic e$ciency.
The government test discount rate for forestry invest-
ment, when non-market bene"ts are included, is current-
ly 6% (HM Treasury, 1997). A cost-bene"t analysis
(Macmillan, 1993) of replanting commercial forests,
which incorporated monetised values for a range of non-
market bene"ts, revealed that almost 40% of the forest
area in Scotland would fail to achieve this rate (Fig. 3).
These forests are characterised by poor "nancial returns
from timber, remoteness, and low or even negative values
for non-market outputs such as recreation. Replanting
these forests is therefore not justi"ed in economic terms
and would represent a case of government failure in the
land market.
An economically e$cient option for the FC would be
to cease forestry activity in these areas and place the land
on the open market (after harvesting the timber). How-
ever, as the land has no economic value, and with
demand from private forestry investors likely to be lim-
ited11, one option would be to give the land to local
communities for a nominal sum. The transfer of land
from FC ownership would not only contribute signi"-
cantly to the government's aim of diversifying land
ownership in Scotland, it would constitute a saving to the
tax payer.
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Case study D: local land monopolies
Scotland has one of the most concentrated forms of
land ownership in the world, with almost 50% of the
total area owned by just over 600 individuals, companies
or trusts (Wightman, 1996). As much of this land is held
in the form of large contiguous estates, often over
10 000 ha in size, a single owner can hold monopoly
power over land use and development in an entire local-
ity. For example, a local developer wishing to purchase
land for housing in a speci"c location often has no
alternative but to approach the local estate. Depending
on circumstances, the estate owner may refuse to sell or
to sell, only at a very high price.
Where speci"c areas of land have been identi"ed as
essential for economic development, local authorities
have been able to use their powers of compulsory
purchase. However, to date these powers have been
used only sparingly, for example in road building
where there are no alternative routes. This is partly
because the process is time-consuming and expensive,
but also because of the rather limited &interpretation' by
local government placed on both &essential economic
development' in the context of monopolistic control of
land.
Economic development is multi-faceted, and it can be
argued that in rural areas relatively small-scale agri-
cultural, forestry and "sh farming developments are
essential to economic development, providing jobs and
stimulating the local economy. Similarly, the pervasive
e!ect of monopoly powers on land price and availability
is not fully recognised. Unlike other factors of production
(or most consumption goods for that matter), land is
spatially de"ned and strictly limited in supply, hence it
can be argued that all land is unique. That is, no two
hectares of land share the same characteristics in terms of
location, bio-physical potential, or indeed cultural heri-
tage. For example, a rural community looking to pur-
chase the local estate would not be very interested in
buying any other Scottish estate!
A broader interpretation of both economic growth and
monopoly power could justify greater use of compulsory
purchase, for example to bring about community owner-
ship as the government has suggested. Indeed, there is no
reason why it should not be exercised on behalf of indi-
viduals with proposals for small-holding, forestry and
tourism enterprises. One major disadvantage of relying
on compulsory purchase is that the current process is
time consuming and expensive. The Scottish Parliament
should therefore consider the creation of a Land Com-
mission with specialist sta!, to process applications for
compulsory purchase in a cost-e!ective manner.
A pre-condition for a monopoly to develop is the
existence of an e!ective barrier to entry. In terms of land
in Scotland, this is achieved in part, by the sheer size of
estates which enables only the very rich to bid. However,
land reformers have long suspected that there are other
barriers. For example, some very large estates have been
bought and sold in a veil of secrecy, despite considerable
public interest and well publicised bids by local consortia
involving public agencies, conservation groups and local
communities (e.g. Mar Lodge Estate and Glenfeshie in
the Cairngorms). In other cases, estates have not been
sold to the highest bidder (e.g. Gaick Estate) because the
management objectives of the prospective owners were
not compatible with sporting interests. A Land Commis-
sion could also be given powers to investigate anti-
competitive practices in the sale and purchase of large
estates.
Although the wider application of compulsory pur-
chase through a specialist Land Commission will help
reduce land-based barriers to development, it is unlikely
to bring about a substantial diversi"cation in ownership
in the Scottish Highlands. A more strategic approach is
also required to encourage a less concentrated pattern of
landownership. With more landowners, there would be
greater competition among landowners, hence lower
land prices and more opportunities for economic growth.
A mandatory deer culling system would, by reducing the
demand for large sporting-type estates, allow more land
to come on to the market. Another option would be to
remove the anomaly in the Succession (Scotland) Act
1964, which allows land to be passed directly to a single
successor. Unlike other property, the spouse and children
have no right to a legal share, and as a consequence, large
estates have not had to be divided into smaller parcels
(Callander, 1997).
Conclusions
The overall conclusions of this paper, based on the
four case studies examined are "rst, market failure is
present in the ownership and management of land in
Scotland and second, past state intervention has not been
very e!ective. Inadequacies in existing legislation have
been identi"ed or, in the case of red deer control, the
government has chosen not to exercise their powers to
the full. Forestry replanting, represents a special case
where direct state intervention is actually responsible for
failure in the land market.
As the political landscape shifts to favour land reform
measures, the analysis presented in this paper suggests
that much can be accomplished without the need for
new legislation or additional public "nancing. For
example, the introduction of mandatory deer culling
quotas would be more cost-e!ective than current ar-
rangements and would, by reducing the demand for
sporting land, o!er opportunities for diversifying land-
ownership in Scotland.
Although this paper has focused on Scotland and the
context for land reform demands di!ers throughout the
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world, one conclusion of global relevance is that market
failure, rather than the free-market per se is a more likely
cause of social unrest over land. This can perhaps be best
illustrated by local land monopolies and the barriers that
they can create for poorer members of society seeking
access to the land resource.
References
Allison, M., 1990. Deer management: a view to the 90s. Forestry and
British Timber 19 (8), 40}41.
Callander, R., 1997. The System of Land Tenure in Scotland * A Re-
view. World Wildlife Fund, Aberfeldy.
Coase, R.H., 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and
Economics 3, 1}44.
Gordon}Du!}Pennington, P., 1997. The price may be deer. Landown-
ing in Scotland (245) 23.
HM Treasury, 1997. Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government.
HMSO, London.
Hunter, J., 1976. The Making of the Crofting Community. John
Donald, Edinburgh.
Scottish O$ce, 1999. Land Reform Policy Group: Recommendations
for Action. Scottish O$ce, Edinburgh.
Leneman, L., 1989. Fit for Heroes Land Settlement in Scotland after
World War 1. Aberdeen Univeristy Press, Aberdeen.
McEwen, J., 1981. Who Owns Scotland. 2nd Edition, Polygon,
Edinburgh.
Macmillan, D.C., 1993. Commercial forests in Scotland: an Economic
appraisal of replanting policy. Journal of Agricultural Economics 44
(1), 51}65.
Macmillan, D.C, Smart, T., Thorburn, A., 1999. A "eld experiment
involving hypothetical and real charitable donations. Environ-
mental and Resource Economics 14, 399}412.
Perman, R., Ma, Y., McGilvray, J., 1996. Natural Resource and Envir-
onmental Economics. Longman, London.
Wightman, A., 1996. Who Owns Scotland. Canongate, Edinburgh.
World Bank, 1975. Land reform. World Bank Paper* Rural Develop-
ment Series. World Bank, Washington DC.
Youngson, D., 1995. Red Deer Management Update. In: Deer, Habitats
and Birds, Conference Proceedings, Battleby, Scottish Natural
Heritage.
D.C. Macmillan / Land Use Policy 17 (2000) 49}57 57
